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In 2004 a set of National Governance Protocols were
established for universities in Australia (DEST 2004)
because there had been some significant breakdowns
that had damaged reputations,caused tens of millions
of dollars in losses and led some universities to the
brink of bankruptcy.In February 2008,the Australian
government decided to separate the National Go-
vernance Protocols from funding requirements,in ef-
fect making these protocols voluntary and the three-
year review of the protocols then underway redun-
dant. However, there is evidence that there are still
significant governance issues prevalent throughout
the Australian higher education sector (Austin 2008;
Blackman et al. 2008; BIHECC 2007; GPSC2 2009a;
GPSC2 2009b;NIG 2007,2008a,2008b,2009;Walters
2006) and that there needs to be consideration as to
how such challenges can be addressed.
Background
The National Institute of Governance (NIG) has a
long-standing interest in university governance. Its
founding director was author of Review of New
Zealand Tertiary Education Institution Governance
(Edwards 2003). The institute was contracted as na-
tional coordinator of the University Governance
Professional Development program by the associa-
tion of chancellors (Swansson, Mow and Bartos
2005). Concurrently the institute has conducted a
range of research projects building an Australian ev-
idence base for innovations in university governance.
The institute has made submissions to the review of
the National Governance Protocols (NIG 2007) and
three further reviews/inquiries since 2007 (NIG
2008a, 2008b, 2009). Most recently governance dis-
putes waged in public have prompted a New South
Wales parliamentary committee to establish an in-
quiry into university governance in that state in
November 2008 (NIG 2009) at which a further sub-
mission was made. In each case concerns have been
raised that governance is weak, poorly managed and
that more formal systems of governance might be ad-
vocated. However, there is a question as to whether
more “hard”forms of governance (Kocourek,Burger
and Birchard 2003) will overcome the problems be-
ing identified.
The concern about university governance has both
general and specific causes.The public attention in the
wake of large enterprise failures (whether public or-
ganisations or companies) has generally required gov-
ernments to reconsider governance arrangements that
were “not long ago regarded as either excellent or at
least as not presenting serious policy problems”
(Kirkpatrick 2004,14).Since 1995 the Australian gov-
ernment,as the sector’s primary public funder,has had
concerns regarding the skills and capacity of universi-
ty governing bodies (generally called councils) to
manage the organisational and financial risks of what
were by then very large enterprises (Hoare 1995).
Such doubts were apparently justified, with a series
of reviews and inquiries (Hoare 1995; Storey 1997;
West 1998; Hamilton 2002; Cameron 2003; AGO
2005).Concerns initially questioned the operating ef-
fectiveness of university governing bodies, with par-
ticular concerns about the perceived lack of focus on
corporate and strategic issues and structures that
hamper management and deter institutions from be-
ing aware of their costs or to minimize them (Hoare
1995; Storey 1997; West 1998). Specific failures and
multimillion dollar losses within universities or sub-
sidiary companies in their control prompted a series
of reviews and inquiries (Hamilton 2002; Cameron
2001; Cameron 2003;AGO 2005). Examples include
(but are not limited to): * National Institute for Governance, University of Canberra.• The impact of losses by Melbourne University
Private Limited (up to $4 million per year to 2001)
on the University of Melbourne. MUPL’s annual
losses were forecast to increase despite increasing
revenue,posing a potential loss of capital and rev-
enue to the university and reducing services sold
to MUPL. A particular concern was the overlap
and hence competition with University of Mel-
bourne services (Cameron 2001).
• From 1999 Royal Melbourne Institute of Tech-
nology experienced a 22.5 percent growth in rev-
enue but a 42 percent increase of expenditure. In
addition to general costs and losses associated with
overheads, research activities, the TAFE division
and a large property portfolio,one significant fac-
tor was the mismanagement of the Academic
Management System, whose $47 million imple-
mentation cost was nearly four times the original
budget while delivering less than the required
functionality, significantly disrupting services to
students.Inadequate governance arrangements in-
cluded contract management practices and unre-
liable information inhibiting effective review of
the performance of management by the Council
(Cameron 2003).
• In New South Wales, public audits of 2004 finan-
cial reports identified five with operating deficits
and three with a liquidity ratio too low to provide
financial safety for cash flow.Key issues identified
included risks associated with subsidiary compa-
nies and off shore activities as fund-raising activi-
ties (AGO 2005).
In the early 2000s the view of both state and
Commonwealth governments reflected the interna-
tional emphasis on the capability of institutions to be
responsible for themselves. The essence of the
Victorian Review of University Governance (Ha-
milton 2002) was to distance the state from responsi-
bility for the financial losses of universities constitut-
ed under their legislation, and strengthen the re-
sponsibility and capability of councils for their insti-
tutions and subsidiaries. The following year the
Commonwealth government introduced the National
Governance Protocols (NGP) as a conditional com-
ponent of funding in the Higher Education Support
Act (HESA) 2003.The NGP offered a significant fi-
nancial incentive for universities to significantly im-
prove their governance and were aimed at culture
change (Bishop 2006).
The eleven National Governance Protocols were ne-
gotiated by the government with the sector including
vice-chancellors and chancellors.These protocols im-
pose obligations on Australian universities and other
higher education providers for (DEST 2004):
• definition of institutional objectives and govern-
ing body purposes and duties (nos. 1, 3);
• systematic professional development programs
and performance evaluations of governing bodies
(no. 4);
• systematic procedures for composition of the gov-
erning body, including limits on size (some were
as large as 90) and specifications of expertise (nos.
2, 5, 6); and
• codification and reporting of business practices of
the university and subsidiaries (nos.7,8,9,10,11).
What have the National Governance Protocols
achieved?
All universities were required to annually report
compliance against NGP to receive (certain) funding,
with a transition period to allow for legislative
changes to Acts. All universities have been assessed
for the years 2004 to 2007 and deemed compliant.
From this it can be inferred that all universities made
the required structural changes and documented
roles and responsibilities in legislation and ancillary
documents.There has been a significant reduction in
risk due to controlled entities and offshore opera-
tions, due in part to better identification of existing
controlled entities and in part to a move towards
stricter procedures for creating controlled entities.
Acknowledgement of poor business models for some
business-type activities led to good practice: closing
loss-making operations.
In 2006 the UGPD Program conducted a survey of
university governors’ responses to the National
Governance Protocols (UGPD 2006).The survey da-
ta showed greater than 80 percent thought their in-
stitutions well placed to satisfy the requirements of
the NGP, and in general Australian universities were
better placed in corporate governance than rhetoric
might suggest.However,this was self-assessment and
evidence shows that there may be too much compla-
cency within the system.
What have the National Governance Protocols not
achieved?
“The compliance assessment entails an examination
of whether required actions have been taken and cri-
teria have been met. It cannot measure behaviours
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and the extent to which good practices have been em-
braced” [emphasis added] (Walters 2006).
The compliance framework of the protocols can be
criticized for generating a tick-a-box culture (see NIG
2008b) and within a few years the Commonwealth
government was expressing concern that the proto-
cols were being perceived by university Councils as
“an invitation to accept the lowest common denomi-
nator”(Bishop 2006).Before 2003 academics and cor-
porate regulators already recognised that closed sys-
tems of compliance,with penalties and/or incentives,
have a tendency to degenerate into boilerplate being
less meaningful as well as incomplete (JCCG 2001;
Conglianese et al. 2004;ASX CGC 2006). Individual
or institutional behaviour can be either malevolent
or negligent,either intending to “comply with the let-
ter of the law but circumvent its underlying purpose”
(Conglianese et al.2004,3) or failing to “focus on the
particular needs, strengths and weaknesses of the
company” (ASX CGC 2006).
Contemporaneously the focus in corporate go-
vernance has shifted from compliance to perfor-
mance (e.g.,Nadler 2004;Young 2006).There is now
a growing body of evidence confirming that cor-
porate governance exerts an important influence on
growth prospects.The most fundamental task of any
institution, and therefore its governing body, is to
ensure its sustainability as a strong,viable and com-
petitive organisation against a background of a
changing environment. “This focus on regulation
rather than performance has arisen despite the fact
that more value is lost through strategic misman-
agement than through fraud and malpractice”
(Young 2006).
Data from the 2006 NIG survey of university gover-
nors suggests that university governing bodies are still
more oriented to compliance than performance and
that satisfying the National Governance Protocols
was not too formidable a task (NIG 2008b). Fur-
thermore, individual comments reveal discrepancies
or shortcomings, including (but not limited to):
• The overall prescriptiveness of the protocols;
• The lack of definition of, as the main example,
“controlled entities”;
• The limited definition of “expertise” as financial;
• The difficulty of operationalising some protocols
(e.g., succession planning) in the external envi-
ronment (where ministerial appointments of
council members take many months).
• The absent, or recent, knowledge of institutional
responses to the protocols.
Fate of the National Governance Protocols
In 2007 the protocols themselves were due for a
three-year operation review. At the same time the
Victorian state government commenced a review of
its higher education legislation, some enabling acts
being over 100 years old.Both of these reviews were
overshadowed by two actions of the new Australian
government in the first months of 2008.
In March it announced a wide ranging review of
Australian higher education whose terms of reference
included regulation of the sector and governance of in-
dividual universities. A month earlier the Australian
government decided to separate the National Go-
vernance Protocols from funding requirements, in ef-
fect making these protocols voluntary and their review
redundant (JCHE 2008).In some respects this is an un-
intended consequence of the fulfillment of a general
election promise to revoke the previous government’s
policy on employment relations, which for this sector
were contained in the same section of HESA 2003 as
the NGP. Subsequent to this change the Australian
government is seeking to replace the NGPs with a vol-
untary code that will be owned and mandated by the
higher education sector.The Australian government is
seeking to develop the code with Universities Austra-
lia, the vice-chancellors’ group, and the University
Chancellors’ Council (DEEWR 2009).
What problems will a voluntary code attempt to solve?
Crises of governance continue in Australian universi-
ties,and recent disputes within governing bodies have
hit headlines in two states and prompted a parlia-
mentary inquiry into governance of NSW universities.
• UNSW vice-chancellor attributes the approxi-
mately $50 million loss on failed establishment of
a UNSW-Asia campus in Singapore to poor gov-
ernance,particularly lack of financial skills on the
part of council (GPSC2a 2009);
• Former UNE chancellor,also former chief execu-
tive and chairman of construction firm, describes
the university as poorly managed and financially
vulnerable, stating that “As recently as last year
the university was to all intents and purposes
technically insolvent” (GPSC2b 2009); and
• VU chancellor and Supreme Court judge engages
the Victorian government solicitor to write a let-ter to council member and state president of the
National Tertiary Education Union president for
breach of the council’s code of conduct for writing
critically of the university’s leadership in a letter
to state and federal members of parliament
(Austin 2008).
Professional approaches to governance and manage-
ment appear to still be a problem.There is evidence
that there is a lack of skills and that the senior com-
mittees do not develop and encourage challenge.The
complexity of the legal framework of universities es-
pecially creates ambivalence toward fiduciary duties
of university councils and individual members. The
now revoked National Governance Protocols re-
quired the insertion of fiduciary duties equivalent to
statutory duties in corporate law into individual uni-
versity enabling acts (DEST 2004). Otherwise, in
Victoria at least,university council members are sub-
ject to neither corporate nor public sector standards
of financial responsibility (NIG 2008a). In this con-
text one Victorian vice-chancellor has argued against
the incorporation of universities under the Cor-
porations Act 2001 from the perception of a func-
tional immunity from insolvency (BIHECC 2007).
University governance and knowledge management
So the question is – why is university governance still
such a problem? A research study undertaken by
NIG explored why these governance breakdowns
may still be occurring and considered what strategies
would need to be adopted in future if governance is
to improve.The study built upon work undertaken by
Blackman et al.(2006),where it was argued that how
knowledge was understood and managed would ac-
tively impact upon organisational outcomes and the
effectiveness of an organisation.The argument in this
context is that as universities become increasingly in-
terested in improving governance to achieve strate-
gic outcomes, the relationship between good gover-
nance and good knowledge becomes central. Un-
derstanding the nature and role of knowledge pro-
cesses and systems is a central concern in the current
global interest in governance.Corporate governance
has always used financial, physical-plant and intel-
lectual capital to build value (Keenan and Aggestam
2001), and university governance should be no dif-
ferent.
Our interest in this research is in the way in which
knowledge is being created, recognised, harnessed,
stored and transferred in support of the governance
and strategic development in the university. This in-
terest emerges as a result of the growing acceptance
that it is the knowledge held within institutions which
enables them to develop and grow (Earl 2001;
Teodorescu 2006).The literature on governance and
board effectiveness emerges from the corporate sec-
tor (Newton and Sackney 2005),but its application to
universities and other educational settings is ac-
knowledged by bodies which recognise that: “The
university is no longer a quiet place to teach and do
scholarly work at a measured pace and contemplate
the universe as in centuries past. It is a big, complex,
demanding, competitive business …” (OECD 2007).
The importance of knowledge development as a
strategic concern in organisations is established as an
important issue for corporate governance (Keenan
and Aggestam 2001), whilst in Australia there has
been a strong impetus in recent years for university
governance to maintain a focus on strategic develop-
ment in contexts of increasingly fast-paced change.
This focus is reflected in the council protocols for
many Australian universities, although some contin-
ue to publish governance protocols that restrict coun-
cil and board roles to approving, supporting, and
overseeing policy systems.
Even in instances where there is an espoused role for
university councils in the development of strategic di-
rection,the practice in governing bodies still lags,with
councils maintaining the heuristics and habits that re-
flect governance in less turbulent times (Blackman et
al. 2007).This limited engagement with strategic ac-
tivity by council has been linked with perspectives of
knowledge that reflect somewhat outdated notions of
the nature and diversity of knowledge in organisa-
tions (Blackman et al. 2006) and the claim is made
that strategic success in the university is dependent
upon richer understandings of the role of knowledge
and its management in governance decision making.
Study methodology
The study sought to determine how knowledge is cre-
ated, shared and transferred within university struc-
tures in order to identify whether possible weakness-
es in this process might be leading to breakdowns in
governance. In order to gather rich data about per-
ceptions of the knowledge creation and transfer
processes in place,the research drew on observations
and semi-structured face-to-face interviews with
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members of academic board and council.Five obser-
vations of each committee were undertaken,totalling
in excess of 40 hours of observation. The observers
used protocols designed to record where knowledge
was recognised as being used,shared or created.They
then noted the type of knowledge being discussed,
from where it emerged and to where it was trans-
ferred. Five interviews were undertaken with mem-
bers of council and academic board (all those inter-
viewed sat on both committees). The interviewees
were chosen to give a range of views of the commit-
tees – they included a staff elected member,a student
member, two previous chairs of academic board and
the vice-chancellor.Between them,these participants
had sat on a range of council subcommittees includ-
ing finance, information technology, campus devel-
opment and resources, and academic board subcom-
mittees including education, admissions and student
services. Three of the interviewees had also been
members of a vice chancellor’s advisory committee
which, while not a formally constituted committee,
had been highly influential in university decision
making. Each interview took one hour and followed
a semi-structured format in which participants were
asked about their role in council; how they under-
stood knowledge;where,in their view,knowledge was
created within the university structure; and the im-
pacts of the way knowledge was or was not created
and transferred upon effective corporate governance.
Observations of committee meetings and transcripts
of interviews were transcribed and analysed using
the NVivo™ qualitative analysis tool. Two major
themes emerged in the data and these were further
investigated through interrogation of the full data
set: firstly: how was the way that knowledge was (or
was not) created and disseminated through the gov-
ernance structures affecting strategic decision mak-
ing and,secondly,who was driving knowledge,inno-
vation and strategy implementation within the gov-
ernance structures.
Findings and discussion
Creation and dissemination of knowledge in
university governance structures affecting strategic
decision making 
Observation and interview data demonstrated that
there was little knowledge creation or transfer oc-
curring at the major decision making forums of the
university. According to those interviewed this was
not a problem as they argued that their role was to
ratify and confirm knowledge and decisions that have
been transferred to them;knowledge creation should
happen in the subcommittees that feed into council
and academic board. Members of these committees
discussed the need for innovation, for “think tanks”,
new strategies and collaboration;however,these were
discussed in terms of the committees’ role in arrang-
ing workgroups to do this thinking and collaborating.
There was no discussion in board or at council that
indicated these groups considered these active de-
velopment roles to be ones they should assume.
A concern that emerged was that the intended mod-
el for knowledge development and transfer,whereby
knowledge created within subcommittees would be
transferred to relevant governance structures in the
university,was not actually occurring.Subcommittees
might be creating useful knowledge and using this to
make recommendations and decisions; however, the
recording mechanisms reduce the transfer to bare in-
formation, stripped of the context and process of
knowledge production and of any meaning.What was
finally reported and ratified at university council and
academic board was a series of decisions, which en-
abled control but not knowledge development.
We would argue that this is having a serious affect up-
on the strategic decision making of the university.
University councils are widely (if not universally)
claimed to be the overarching decision making body
of the university. However, what is clear here is that
this cannot be the case. Moreover, during the obser-
vations it was clear that very few of those involved in
the meetings actively took part – in most meetings
only a handful of those present spoke and often any
opportunities for debate were stifled. In fact it be-
came clear that the processes at academic board and
at council were focused on attempting to restrict the
impact of external change on the organisation by in-
creasing control mechanisms,rather than by innovat-
ing to adapt to environmental turbulence. Examples
obtained through observation highlighted the com-
mittees’ preoccupation with monitoring the progress
of draft policy and approving decisions made else-
where, with very little comment or challenge. Pre-
sentation of reports, feedback from committees and
papers tabled for review consumed the vast majority
of time and effort in both committees. While there
was some development of definitions,which required
minimal creative discussion,generally the committee
process limited knowledge development, placing the
focus instead on information transfer.This focus wasreinforced within the committees, members being
censured at times for challenging the information
presented to the group.
The structures’ focus on cementing process and main-
taining stability is in direct contradiction to the cur-
rent theoretical discussion of appropriate knowledge
strategies in environments of flux. These strategies,
similarly, appear antithetical to improvements to the
university’s progress in increasingly uncertain times.
In terms of effective governance,it became clear that
unless the way that the council protocols were inter-
preted changed in terms of knowledge management
principles (Blackman et al.2008),many major strate-
gic decisions would not be made within the expected
frameworks.
Who drives knowledge, innovation and strategy
implementation? 
An important implication of the lack of knowledge
transfer between committees is that any new knowl-
edge created resides solely within the individuals who
took part in any decision-making process – mostly
tacit and usually unrecorded.When new decisions are
being made, dialogue in committees will only enable
previous knowledge to be used, provided those indi-
viduals are still with the organisation and they are in-
volved in the decision-making process. If not, the
competitive advantage that such knowledge might
provide will be lost. This means that not only is the
actual decision-making taking place outside the key
governance bodies,those within the governance bod-
ies who helped frame the decision will be likely to
hold undue influence over others within the commit-
tees. Observations led to the conclusion that so few
members of the committees were contributing be-
cause they were ill-equipped to do so.Interviews con-
firmed this with participants commenting that they
often did not have the knowledge of where ideas had
emerged from or that decisions were made elsewhere
and they were not encouraged to challenge them. It
was clear that senior university management saw the
council as a place to get their previously agreed deci-
sions ratified.This led to a concern for effective gov-
ernance in terms of the way the agency relationship
was being framed.
An agency relationship is one where one party or
principal employs another to manage and run their
company or other organisation for them. An agent
will be paid to reflect the best interests of those em-
ploying them who should be primarily focused upon
the best outcomes for the organisation (Frankforter
et al. 2007) and the governance systems should be in
place to ensure that the employers maintain control
over the agent. However, there has been concern
raised over the years as to the efficacy of such rela-
tionships and their ability to deliver the best out-
comes for the organisation and its sustainability
(Frankforter et al. 2007; Eisenhardt 1989).There is a
tendency in such relationships for their success to be
based upon short-term successes and self-interest
(Hill and Jones 1992) as this enables those taking part
to understand the benefit of the decisions that they
are taking. Moreover, as the agent needs to justify
their decisions this will be more likely if either (a) the
benefit to the principal is clear or (b) the task is dif-
ficult and there is a high level of trust in the agent.
There are concerns with the latter, however, as it
means that the agent may be able to become the ma-
jor decision maker and the governance systems may
not prove to be adequate checks and balances.
We would argue that in a situation where there is lim-
ited knowledge shared or there are potentially under-
skilled individuals undertaking the governance roles,
it is highly likely that the effective of the governance
will be undermined.We would argue that this is the
case in many Australian university governance sys-
tems at present.
Implications
In this paper we have argued that there are still con-
siderable problems with governance in Australian
universities.It was stated earlier that the focus of the
protocols was upon “hard” governance and we now
consider whether the two themes identified here lead
to a greater recognition for managing the “soft” side
of governance. According to Kocourek, Burger and
Birchard (2003) there are seven elements to “soft”
governance:
• Select the right directors;
• Train them continuously;
• Give them the right information;
• Balance the power of the CEO and directors;
• Nurture a culture of collegial questioning;
• Gain from directors an adequate commitment of
time; and
• Measure and improve.
We would argue that these can be undermined by
both of the elements outlined in this paper. Having
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the appropriate directors may be considered in terms
of skills but also needs to be considered in terms of
how open they are to developing,acquiring and chal-
lenging new knowledge.There will be a need not on-
ly for not a range of business skills, but also life and
thinking skills enabling an ongoing and robust debate.
Without discussion no new knowledge can be trans-
ferred and no novelty will emerge (Cook and Brown
1999).The need for ongoing training and development
also supports the need to develop new skills and cre-
ate informed debate. The balancing of power is di-
rectly related to the issues of agency power,and with-
out a culture that enables and supports challenge,the
agent’s power will become steadily stronger.
Consequently, we contend that the issues pertaining
to knowledge development and transfer, both in
terms of how it is done and who drives it are crucial
to the effective development of governance both
within universities and elsewhere.We call for a much
greater focus upon the research into “soft” wiring
governance in place of the increasingly common com-
pliance model and seek research that links differing,
but related, areas of organisation studies to gover-
nance in order to develop new models of both struc-
tures and implementation.
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